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SUMMARY - The supposed golden age in relations between mainland China and Taiwan may not have 
been so golden, but the two sides have a chance to keep constructive ties under new Taiwanese 
leadership.   
 
On May 20, 2016, Tsai Ing-wen took the oath of office to become the fourth directly elected 
president of the Republic of China (ROC), which is commonly referred to as Taiwan. 
Tsai’s inaugural address was clearly aimed at stabilizing and even advancing the relationship 
between Taipei and Beijing. But despite her efforts at reassurance, it may be difficult to 
preserve the recent gains in cross-strait relations. 
The eagerly awaited address contained few surprises. She called attention to a long list of 
challenges facing Taiwan, and she urged Taiwanese people to have patience with the new 
government as it works its way through that difficult agenda. 
Tsai’s address followed the template laid out in her presidential campaign. She devoted most of 
the speech to Taiwan’s internal issues and problems: transitional justice, opportunities for 
young people, social welfare concerns, and economic challenges. 
The discussion of relations between Taiwan and China was relatively brief; it too mostly 
repeated themes from the campaign. Tsai said nothing that could be perceived as an attempt to 
institutionalize or advance the separation of Taiwan from China—no moves toward de jure 
independence. Instead, the most novel element in the speech was a reference that reinforces 
Taiwan’s status as a Chinese entity. It wasn’t what Beijing was hoping for, but it was an 
intriguing gesture. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was hoping Tsai would acknowledge 
the 1992 Consensus, a tacit agreement between Taipei and Beijing that both Taiwan and the 
mainland are part of a single Chinese nation, the precise interpretation of which differs on the 
two sides. Tsai made no mention of the consensus, but she did say her policy would be guided 
by a 1992 ROC law called the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area 
and the Mainland Area, a document she had not previously mentioned. 
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A Golden Age? 
The past eight years under the leadership of Ma Ying-jeou in Taiwan have seemingly been a 
golden age in cross-strait relations. Since 2008, there has been more economic cooperation, 
more political dialogue, and more social interaction than ever before. Taipei and Beijing have 
finalized two dozen economic agreements, cross-strait travel and tourism have reached new 
heights, and collaboration between working-level government officials has become standard 
operating procedure. 
During the Ma era, policymakers on both sides (and in other countries) were able to turn their 
attention to other issues. They were freed from worrying about a possible crisis in the Taiwan 
Strait. 
Now, as the new administration takes office, both sides are showing doubts about how much 
longer this apparent golden age can continue. 
But what has been called a golden age was never truly golden. Although the two sides chose for 
pragmatic reasons to overlook their differences, those differences were substantial, even 
during the Ma era. Beijing’s Taiwan policy makers believed Ma shared their goal of bringing 
the two sides closer, so they were willing to sidestep the toughest issues. But they are deeply 
skeptical about Tsai, whose Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has a history of advocating for 
Taiwanese independence. Tsai’s arrival may make the differences between the two sides more 
visible, but the truth is, they’ve been there all along. 
During the Ma era, Beijing and Taipei used the 1992 Consensus to conceal a yawning gap 
between their positions. The consensus purports to reflect an agreement the two sides’ 
representatives reached at a series of meetings in Hong Kong that year. The representatives 
agreed that both sides believed Taiwan to be part of China, but decided to leave unspecified 
what was meant by the word China. To the PRC, the 1992 Consensus means Taipei accepts the 
mainland view that Taiwan is part of the PRC; to Taiwan, the essence of the consensus is the 
PRC’s willingness to allow Taiwan to have its own concept of what China is. The contrivance of 
the 1992 Consensus only works as long as neither side listens too closely to what the other is 
saying. 
Beijing would prefer to keep this foundation untouched. It has made Tsai’s endorsement of the 
1992 Consensus a requirement for continuing the positive interactions that flourished under 
former president Ma Ying-jeou, because it finds the agreement a convenient formula—vague 
enough to reassure a wide range of audiences. 
But Tsai and her DPP allies cannot quite accept the 1992 Consensus. One might say Tsai’s 
policy is asymptotic to the accord: she can get infinitely close, but never touch it. 
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Tsai’s Approach 
The inaugural address exemplified this approach. Tsai said that the 1992 meetings “arrived at 
various joint acknowledgements and understandings” and that she “respect[s] this historical 
fact.” Respecting a historical fact is as close as one can get to accepting it without actually 
doing so; citing “joint acknowledgements and understandings” is as close as one can get to the 
idea of consensus without actually using the word itself. 
Tsai’s speech repeated many other elements of her long-standing approach as well. She 
characterized the 1992 meetings as having been conducted “in a spirit of mutual understanding 
and a political attitude of seeking common ground while setting aside differences.” The talks 
made possible “over twenty years of interactions and negotiations across the Strait [that] have 
enabled and accumulated outcomes which both sides must collectively cherish and sustain.” 
Tsai also restated the “existing political foundations” for cross-strait relations: “the fact of the 
1992 talks between the two institutions representing each side across the Strait,” “the existing 
Republic of China constitutional order,” “the outcomes of over twenty years of negotiations 
and interactions across the Strait,” and “the democratic principle and prevalent will of the 
people of Taiwan.” 
If most of the speech was familiar, there was at least one intriguing new element: the mention 
of a 1992 ROC law governing cross-strait relations. Tsai said, “The new government will 
conduct cross-Strait affairs in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution, the Act 
Governing Relations Between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, and other 
relevant legislation.” As best as can be determined, Tsai never mentioned this law in the year 
leading up to the election and her inauguration, so its addition to the speech is noteworthy. 
The 1992 law mentioned by Tsai established the institutions through which Taiwan has 
conducted its relationship with the mainland for the past twenty-four years. It established the 
Mainland Affairs Council as a cabinet-level agency for cross-strait matters, and it set the 
parameters within which unofficial, quasi-official, and even—during the Ma administration— 
working-level official interactions were conducted. 
But what makes the law interesting today is its clear definition of the ROC as a government 
that claims territory both on the mainland and in Taiwan, and its mention of unification. Its 
stated  purpose is as follows: “This Act is specially enacted for the purposes of ensuring the 
security and public welfare in the Taiwan Area, regulating dealings between the peoples of the 
Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, and handling legal matters arising therefrom before 
national unification.” The law defines the Taiwan Area as the main island of Taiwan, as well as 
the nearby islands of Penghu, Jinmen, and Mazu (all of which are administered from Taipei); 
the Mainland Area is defined as “the territory of the Republic of China outside the Taiwan 
Area.” 
PRC leaders could interpret Tsai’s mention of this law negatively—after all, they do not 
recognize the existence of the ROC. 
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Nonetheless, a positive interpretation is also possible. Tsai has indicated that she does not 
reject the concept of the ROC and of its connection to China. By mentioning this law as a 
touchstone for her policy, she is tethering her leadership to a long-standing interpretation—
enshrined in Taiwan’s constitution and laws—that links Taiwan to China. 
Beijing’s response to Tsai’s inaugural address suggests that it is not impressed by this 
development; it graded her performance “incomplete.” The leaders of the PRC were hoping for 
a clear endorsement of the 1992 Consensus; what they got was almost that but not quite, and a 
new element made its debut. 
It is important to note that this new element steps away from de jure independence, in that it 
affirms the ROC’s traditional self-definition. Beijing should give it careful attention. 
 
Optimism and Realism Ahead 
Three developments, in particular, lead to the conclusion that even if Tsai had recited the 
magic words “1992 Consensus” in her inaugural address, cross-strait relations would still be in 
for a rocky time. 
First, even if Taiwan’s leaders were willing to accept the 1992 agreement, there is no consensus 
about the consensus among Taiwan’s public. Many Taiwanese people agree that having a 
formula that allows relations to move forward is positive and useful, but few are comfortable 
with the content of the 1992 Consensus as Beijing understands it—as an acknowledgement that 
Taiwan is part of the same China that is embodied in the PRC state. 
In this context, Tsai’s refusal to hide Taiwan’s reality behind the fig leaf of the 1992 Consensus 
carries risks, but it also has the virtue of honesty. During the so-called golden age, messages 
from the Taiwanese side tended to understate the Taiwanese public’s skepticism of the 
mainland. Tsai’s message may be less comforting to decisionmakers on the mainland, but it 
will allow them to formulate policy based on an accurate assessment of the conditions they 
face. 
Second, Taiwan’s experiences under Ma Ying-jeou already revealed the limits of Beijing’s 
friendliness—the supposed golden age was tarnished by the PRC’s reluctance to bestow 
benefits that Taiwan might pocket. For example, Ma prioritized efforts to improve cross-strait 
relations ahead of attempts to expand Taiwan’s international space, such as seeking to 
participate in international organizations. He defended his approach by claiming that the PRC 
would reward these steps by removing obstacles to Taiwan’s international participation, 
including green-lighting new bilateral trade agreements for Taiwan. In fact, however, through 
eight years of cross-strait warming, Taiwan’s international space expanded very little. Taiwan’s 
political isolation and economic marginalization have not abated. And as a result, Taiwanese 
people are increasingly worried that the island has become overdependent on the mainland for 
its economic survival. 
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It is hardly surprising, then, that Tsai’s economic proposals focus on escaping marginalization 
and overdependence. She is more focused on joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership (a 
multilateral trade agreement for Pacific Rim states in the Americas and East Asia) and 
reorienting Taiwan’s industry toward Southeast Asia than she is on continuing to cultivate 
economic ties with the PRC. These developments may be unwelcome in Beijing, but they are 
driven by the perception in Taiwan that the PRC will not help Taiwan to thrive economically no 
matter what, so the island must look outward for its economic future. 
Third, it is unlikely that policymakers in Beijing would trust Tsai even if she had embraced the 
1992 Consensus, so accepting it would likely have been an empty gesture—costly at home and 
of little value across the strait. 
PRC leaders distrust Tsai for personal reasons—her connections to another of Taiwan’s former 
presidents, Lee Teng-hui, and her involvement in his Two-States Theory are two of the biggest 
factors—as well as her affiliation with the DPP. The DPP emerged from Taiwan’s pro-
democracy movement in the 1980s as a strong advocate for democratization and a government 
focused, not on the long-standing Kuomintang project of unifying China under the ROC flag, 
but on serving the needs of the Taiwanese people. The strongest statement of the DPP’s 
attachment to Taiwan as an end in itself was its 1991 platform plank calling for Taiwan to sever 
its ties with China and seek recognition as an independent state. The DPP no longer advocates 
for de jure independence, but many of its supporters still nurture dreams of an independent 
Taiwan, and the party has so far been unable to remove or even freeze the independence plank 
of its platform. 
This attachment to the independence cause is a central reason why PRC leaders do not trust 
Tsai—or any DPP politician. Even though endorsing the 1992 Consensus would not have been 
enough to overcome Beijing’s suspicion of Tsai, her refusal to do so reinforces Beijing’s 
perception that the adjustments in DPP policy are tactics aimed at buying time so the party can 
pursue its ultimate goal of formal independence. 
It is in this context that Tsai’s decision to highlight the law governing relations between the two 
areas in her most important speech since being elected is especially intriguing. If Tsai’s goal 
were to push forward de jure independence, she would hardly begin by embracing a law that 
sets cross-strait relations on a foundation that defines Taiwan and the mainland as parts of a 
single entity. 
For cross-strait relations, the golden age may not be a reality, but the door is open for a silver 
age characterized by optimism and tempered by realism. 
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